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International Law in News
 After recent fighting be-
tween rival forces, African lead-
ers have backed plans to deploy 
regional troops to South Sudan. 
Soldiers for the African Union 
(AU) force are to come from 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Su-
dan, and Uganda. 
Clashes between troops loy-
al to President SalvaKiir and 
Vice-President RiekMachar had 
threatened a recent peace deal. 
More than 200 people are said 
to have died in clashes between 
the rival leaders’ forces. The 
violence began with a shootout, 
and has since involved the use 
of heavy artillery, tanks, and he-
licopters. 
Following the conflict, a 
12,000-strong UN peacekeeping 
force is already in the country 
and the AU force would have 
a stronger mandate. South Su-
dan’s government says it is op-
posed the deployment of the 
force. President Kiir will be 
hoping that the African Union 
shelves its plan to deploy troops 
in South Sudan as it did in the 
case of Burundi. 
“We are not ready for a de-
ployment of even a single ad-
ditional soldier,” South Sudan’s 
Information Minister, Michael 
Makuei Lueth, told the BBC’s 
Focus on Africa radio pro-
gramme. “That does not solve 
the problem.” 
“The UN doesn’t have the 
mandate to impose peace,” the 
AFP news agency quoted AU 
Peace and Security Commis-
sioner Smail Chergui as saying 
at the AU summit in Rwanda’s 
capital, Kigali.
“They are there where there 
is peace to keep. African troops 
are ready to engage in very dif-
ficult situations.”
He explained that the mis-
sion would be similar to the 
463
International Law-in News
Volume 13 Number 3 April 2016
deployment of a 3,000-strong 
special force that took on the 
M23 rebels in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in 2013.Over 
the weekend, UN chief Ban Ki-
moon expressed his support for 
the AU deployment. But Mr Lu-
eth blamed the recent fighting 
on the peace deal which, he said, 
was imposed on the country by 
regional mediators.
“As a sovereign state… this 
thing cannot be imposed on us 
without our consent,” he said, 
adding that it would not “serve 
the interests of the people of 
South Sudan”.
So far the continental body 
has only sent forces in at the re-
quest of the state in need. Theo-
retically it can intervene against 
a nation’s wishes, which is part 
of the remit of the new rapid-
response African Standby Force. 
The AU has a history of talk-
ing tough but so far has been un-
able to rein in problematic Afri-
can leaders. It is also struggling 
to fund its operations - so taking 
on a new intervention force, re-
liant on external support, will 
only add to its challenges.
The AU wants to model this 
new force on the Force Interven-
tion Brigade sent to eastern DR 
Congo to battle rebel groups. 
That was a collaboration in-
volving the AU, the UN and the 
Southern African Development 
Community. The force defeat-
ed the M23 rebels after some 
800,000 people had fled their 
homes during their insurgency.
Mr Kiir’s troops make up 
the majority in and around the 
capital, Juba. So it would be a 
huge challenge for the AU force 
to attempt to call them to order, 
but it would provide a buffer to 
the outnumbered troops on Mr 
Machar’s side, whose where-
abouts following the recent 
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The final impact of the British people’s dramatic decision to leave the world’s most ambitious regional 
integration project has yet to unfold. But what does the Brexit mean for other regional integration efforts 
around the world?
In Africa, national govern-
ments as well as continental in-
stitutions like the African Union 
(AU) and the Pan-African Par-
liament will no doubt grapple 
with the broader political sig-
nificance of the U.K. decision to 
exit the European Union. These 
two institutions in particular are 
at the forefront of the continent’s 
integration initiatives. The Eu-
ropean integration project had 
reached a far more advanced 
stage, and few direct compari-
sons were possible between the 
E.U. and AU. But to many AU 
watchers, the E.U. had seemed 
an impenetrable supranational 
project. Are there any lessons 
here for the AU and its quest for 
a fully united Africa?
By most accounts, the 
“leave” vote was won on the 
back of a widely held belief 
among Britons that the U.K. has 
relinquished its sovereignty to 
Brussels’ bureaucrats. And, as 
successive opinion polls have 
shown, they are not alone in 
thinking that. Across mainland 
Europe, ordinary people blame 
the E.U. for their growing dif-
ficulty making ends meet in a 
context of low growth and ris-
ing unemployment. Migration 
inflows, which they view as a 
threat to both their cultural and 
economic security, has for many 
become a primary target of their 
ire. This much Brussels knew, 
because for more than a decade 
now there has been an uptick 
in right-wing nationalist par-
ties across Europe. The E.U. 
was not, however, prepared for 
its vulnerability to the backlash, 
and the ramifications for the ex-
pansion of the union.
The question of sovereignty 
also stands central to Agenda 
2063, the AU’s blueprint for 
continental integration, adopted 
in 2013. This framework docu-
ment envisages “a sovereign, 
independent and self-reliant 
continent” where “[t]he political 
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unity of Africa will be the culmi-
nation of the integration process, 
including the free movement 
of people, the establishment of 
continental institutions, and full 
economic integration.”
This political unity, it ac-
knowledges, will be a long-
term endeavor requiring a ma-
jor paradigm shift in the minds 
of Africans. According to the 
framework document, a core 
component of this shift must be 
that “Africa should speak with 
one voice and cede sovereignty 
in order to make progress and 
strengthen collective unity.” Yet, 
given the recent European expe-
rience, how willing are Africans 
to surrender their sovereignty 
to entities outside of the nation-
state?
The results vary from region 
to region, but levels of ignorance 
about the AU, and the perceived 
absence of its role in the respec-
tive countries, were most evident 
in North and East Africa. These 
findings suggest that the AU’s 
sphere of influence remains lim-
ited, as could be expected from 
a relatively young supranational 
institution. At this stage, few 
Africans are likely to view the 
AU’s impact as a threat to their 
sovereignty, as their respective 
governments guide political and 
economic processes.
But what happens in the hy-
pothetical situation where gov-
ernments may be required to 
cede some elements of sover-
eignty — as Agenda 2063 advo-
cates — and abide by regional 
protocols and sanctions on is-
sues related to governance? To 
gauge this response, the survey 
prompted respondents to indi-
cate which of two statements is 
closer to their own view:
1) An integrationist stance — 
The first statement argued that 
all governments in a particular 
region have a duty to guarantee 
free elections and prevent human 
rights abuses in the rest of that 
region, and that a lack of com-
pliance might be met with politi-
cal pressure, economic sanctions 
and even military force.
2) Individual sovereignty — 
The second statement explicitly 
rejected regional interference 
and proposed that each country 
in the region should respect the 
independence of others and al-
low them to make their own de-
cisions about how their country 
should be governed.
While arguments for pan-Af-
rican unity to reverse the devas-
tating legacy of colonialism still 
predominate in the hallways of 
the AU, the Afrobarometer find-
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ings show that the majority of 
respondents (58 percent) favor 
the second statement. It is clear 
that national sovereignty matters 
to Africans, in spite of the more 
amplified pro-integration rheto-
ric from Addis Ababa, where the 
AU’s bureaucracy resides. The 
AU to date has largely pursued 
a policy of non-interference, de-
spite its overall goal of integrat-
ing African nations.There are, 
however, tentative signs that 
there is growing momentum for 
regional integration. At the AU’s 
Johannesburg summit in 2015, 
discussions commenced on the 
creation of an African Continen-
tal Free Trade Area by 2017, and 
in 2016 the continental body an-
nounced its intention to pilot an 
African electronic visa to pro-
mote free cross-border move-
ment for all Africans. But details 
on the progress and implementa-
tion of both remain sketchy. Per-
haps, therefore, the Brexit vote 
comes at an opportune time, as 
a caution to the AU and the con-
tinent’s 54 sovereign states to 
avoid the price that the E.U. has 
had to pay for its apparent tone-
deafness at an advanced stage 
of the European integration 
process. Whatever its approach, 
it will serve the AU well to se-
quence the integration agenda 
in ways that incorporate, rather 
than react to, the expectations 
and fears that Africans may have 
of closer continental integration. 
(ARD)
THE EAC AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
(//www.trademarkea.com/news/the-eac-and-regional-integration/)
 Regional integration is still 
a highly discussed topic with the 
Brexit vote still fresh in minds 
across the globe. Of course, over 
two months on, conversations 
have moved beyond shock, joy 
and dismay. The focus is cur-
rently on the potential effects of 
the decision made by the British 
people.On surface, it may seem as 
though African nations will not be 
directly affected once the British 
Prime Minister triggers Article 50. 
While this article will not focus on 
the potential consequences, it is 
important to note that there will be 
both positive and negative afteref-
fects.
There are analysts, econo-
mists and policymakers sharing 
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their thoughts as to the impact 
on Africa as a region and spe-
cifically for individual countries. 
But what the Brexit vote should 
teach us is that no one can ac-
curately make predictions about 
such issues. It is within this vein 
that the question of the East Af-
rican Community (EAC) comes 
to the table.
Should integration in this re-
gion still be a priority? Should 
the pace of the integration move-
ment be hastened or slowed 
down? Signs coming out of Aru-
sha suggest that integration for 
the region is still on course and 
why shouldn’t it be? The revived 
Community, which is a few 
years away from its twenty-first 
birthday, has moved somewhat 
slowly and that has worked well 
so farther have been criticisms 
over the years that the process 
should move faster but to what 
avail? With a cumulative popu-
lation of approximately 146 mil-
lion it makes sense for there to 
be a union among the member 
states but there is no rush for it to 
be defined as desired by econo-
mists and analysts.
The Brexit vote has left 
questions as to the fragility of 
integration among countries but 
it would be hasty to assume that 
regional integration does not 
work. Each region is different 
as should the tenets and patterns 
of regional agreements. The 
cookie cutter formulas and the 
set in stone timelines should be 
ignored and the process be al-
lowed to continue growing in an 
organic though structured man-
ner.
It is a good sign that the 
EAC’s integration process has 
managed to implement three 
of four stages from its Devel-
opment Strategy: the Customs 
Union, Common Market and 
the Monetary Union.These first 
three stages of the integration 
process lay the foundation for 
the fourth: the Political Federa-
tion. There is talk in some quar-
ters that the political federation 
should be fast-tracked, but to 
what end?With two member 
states expecting to have national 
elections in 2017, waiting may 
not be a bad idea. Why not place 
the focus on delivering on the 
first three phases?
The decision to make Kiswa-
hili the second official language 
of the East African Legislative 
Assembly, the current plans to 
phase out the dollar as the cross-
border trade currency as well as 
working together to capitalize 
on the African Growth Opportu-
nity Act (AGOA) are just a few 
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of the initiatives which, if har-
nessed, could truly change the 
lives of individual citizens with-
in the EAC. While Kiswahili is 
spoken in all the member states 
it is most pervasive in Tanzania 
and Kenya with the other na-
tions having a smaller portion 
of their population using the 
language. With only a segment 
of the bloc’s population prop-
erly speaking and using Kiswa-
hili, there is need to increase the 
numbers which in itself requires 
policy initiatives as well as strat-
egy development and implemen-
tation.
Phasing out the dollar for 
cross-border trade across the 
EAC partner states will be a 
game changer for small- and 
medium-sized businesses. The 
savings gained from being able 
to trade in one’s own currency is 
expected to increase income as 
well as expand the trading indus-
try in all countries involved. For 
this plan to work, there will need 
to be education campaigns as 
well as changes to banking laws, 
among other things. Again, this 
is an area which needs specific 
attention in order to facilitate 
successful implementation.
While different member 
states have different arrange-
ments within AGOA, individ-
ual EAC partner states, and the 
bloc as a whole, stand to benefit. 
There is much work to be done 
with regards to regional integra-
tion for East Africa but the Com-
munity needs to continue work-
ing at its own pace. Delivering 
on plans which positively affect 
the livelihood and existence of 
citizens is more important than 
meeting timelines. (RPN) 
